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I. INTRODUCTION
In Davis v. Mississippi' the United States Supreme Court
held that the detention of a criminal suspect for purely investi-
gatory purposes was a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.2 That being so, traditional jurisprudence
would seem to dictate that such detentions could no longer be
made upon a showing of less than probable cause to arrest.3
Since probable cause is usually absent at the investigatory stage,
the Davis holding would appear to severely limit the scope of
permissible criminal investigatory procedures, and such a limita-
tion would proportionately limit success in the detection and
apprehension of crime. Yet to allow the police broad latitude
here would endanger fundamental individual liberties. The
Davis court, in dicta, suggested a possible solution to this dilem-
ma: under carefully delineated circumstances detentions for
fingerprinting might be permissible upon a showing of less than
probable cause as traditionally defined. This suggestion re-
sulted in the formulation of Rule 41.1,4 a proposed addition to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41.1 would per-
mit certain identification procedures to be taken pursuant to
court order upon the showing of a certain standard of evidence
not amounting to probable cause to arrest. This procedure, if
constitutional, would be an efficient compromise between the
investigatory techniques requisite to effective law enforcement
and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
1. 394U.S. 721 (1969).
2. Id. at 726-27. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
3. In determining the existence of probable cause to arrest, the
issue is:
whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within
[the arresting officers!] knowledge and of which they had rea-
sonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or
was committing an offense.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
4. 52 F.R.D. 462 (1971).
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This note will examine the conditions which created the need
for such a procedure as that embodied in proposed Rule 41.1, the
mechanics through which the rule would be implemented, the
constitutionality of the less than probable cause to arrest stand-
ard, the separate identification procedures available under the
rule, and the sanction for noncompliance with the court order.
II.
A. THE DAVIS CASE AND THE NEED FOR A WORKABLE RULE
The petitioner in Davis was one of at least 24 Negro youths
who were rounded up after an alleged rape, brought to the police
station, briefly questioned and fingerprinted. All were then
released except petitioner, who was held overnight in jail and
fingerprinted a second time. The latter fingerprints were
matched by the F.B.I. with prints found in the victim's home.
This evidence was admitted over objection at petitioner's trial
for rape and he was subsequently convicted. The Court held
the fingerprint evidence to be the product of a detention made
illegal due to the lack of probable cause to arrest, and therefore
inadmissible at trial.6 The fingerprints taken immediately after
petitioner was brought to the police station, as well as those
taken during the time he was in jail, were held to be inadmis-
sible because, the Court said,
to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the
investigatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment. Investigatory seizures would
subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the harass-
ment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention. Nothing
is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to
prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our
citizenry, whether these instrusions be termed "arrests" or
"investigatory detentions."6
The basis for a lawful search or seizure is the presence of a
quantum of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the suspect
committed it. The necessary quantum of evidence may vary
from case to case,7 but the general definition of probable cause
5. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held
that evidence which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is
inadmissible in federal prosecutions. In 1961 the Court held that the
exclusionary rule enunciated in Weeks was applicable to state prose-
cutions as well by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. 394 U.S. at 726-27.
7. See Armentano, The Standards for Probable Cause Under the
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to arrest is whether a prudent man, given all the facts and cir-
cumstances known to him at the time of his decision, would
believe that the suspect had committed the offense." This tra-
ditional formulation, requiring something more than a 50 per cent
probability, coupled with the broad language0 of Davis, has
created serious problems for law enforcement officers in crim-
inal investigations.10 Federal officers may have, for example,
fingerprints found at the scene of the crime which would posi-
tively identify the criminal. Under Davis, given the absence of
probable cause to arrest, the officers could not constitutionally
detain a suspect long enough to obtain his fingerprints. Without
the suspect's fingerprints they might never be able sufficiently
to connect him with the crime to meet the requirement of prob-
able cause to arrest." This situation has prompted one court
to comment that "[w]hat [the policeman] needs is . . . some
creative legal thinking on the subject of how [he] should pro-
ceed under these circumstances."' 2
Fourth Amendment, 44 CoNNi. B.J. 137, 179 (1970):
[A]t present, there are at least six probable cause standards:(1) the probable cause necessary to effect a search or arrest
with a warrant; (2) the probable cause necessary to justify a
warrantless search incident to an arrest; (3) the probable cause
required to obtain a search warrant to make an administrative
search; (4) the cause, as explained in Terry, which will justify
a self-protective search where probable cause to arrest is ab-
sent; (5) the probable cause required to make a routine border
search; and (6) the probable cause, expressed in terms of a
"clear indication," which must be shown to justify an intrusion
beyond the surface of the skin.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. Criticism has been directed at Davis for its unnecessarily broad
language and the sweeping scope of the decision. See Carrington,
Speaking for the Police, 61 3. Capa L.C. & P.S. 244, 255-56 (1970). The
decision also prompted one court to observe satirically:
It is true that the learned author of the Davis opinion did not
describe the manner in which authorization of a judicial officer
is to be obtained for the purpose of a detention for fingerprint-
ing of someone for whose arrest probable cause does not exist.
Perhaps that procedure will be made clear in the process of the
gradual unveiling of the edifice of perfect justice in which the
high court is engaged.
People v. Reserva, 2 Cal. App. 3d 151, 154, 82 Cal. Rptr. 333, 334 (1969).
10. Carrington, supra note 9, at 256-57.
11. The police might make a "pretext arrest" for a lesser offense
for which they may or may not have probable cause to arrest and then
attempt to use the fingerprints thus obtained in their investigation of
the principal crime. However, if the fingerprints connected the suspect
with the crime, the evidence so obtained would be excluded at trial if
the original arrest could be proved to be merely a sham tactic. Mills
v. Wainwright, 415 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1969).
12. United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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B. THE MECHANICS OF RuLE 41.1
The "creative legal thinking" thus called for resulted in the
formulation of proposed Rule 41.1. A Rule 41.1 "nontestimonial
identification order"'13 is available upon a showing of a certain
standard of evidence, not amounting to probable cause to arrest,
for any of the following identification tests:
fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood
specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples, or
other reasonable physical or medical examination, handwriting
exemplars, voice samples, photographs, and lineups.
14
Such an order "may be issued by a federal magistrate upon
request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for
the government."' 5  The request "may be made prior to the
arrest of a suspect, after arrest and prior to trial or, when
13. The term "nontestimonial identification" has been applied to
these procedures because they have uniformly been held not to be
within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
Grimes v. United States, 405 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1968) (fingerprints and
hair samples); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting
exemplar and voice sample); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (blood sample); United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758
(D. D.C. 1954) (urine specimen); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d
923 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967) (photographs); Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (lineup).
14. Rule 41.1 (1) (3), 52 F.R.D. 409, 466-67 (1971).
15. Rule 41.1 (a), id. at 462. The official comments refer to Rule
54 (c), Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts (January,
1970) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft] for the definition of "federal
magistrate." 52 F.R.D. at 469. The Preliminary Draft states:
"Federal Magistrate" means a United States magistrate as de-
fined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639, a United States commissioner, ajudge of the United States or another judge or judicial officer
specifically empowered by statute in force in any territory or
possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of
Columbia, to perform a function to which a particular rule
relates.
Preliminary Draft at 92.
"Federal law enforcement officer" is defined in Rule 41.1 (1) (2)
as
any government agent who is engaged in the enforcement of the
criminal laws and who is authorized by the Attorney General
to apply for or execute a nontestimonial identification order.
52 F.R.D. at 466.
"Attorney for the government" is also defined by reference to Pre-
liminary Draft, Rule 54(c). 52 F.R.D. at 469. The Preliminary Draft
provides:
"Attorney for the government" means the Attorney General,
an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United States
Attorney, an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney
and when applicable to cases arising under the laws of Guam
means the Attorney General of Guam or such other person or
persons as may be authorized by the laws of Guam to act therein.
Preliminary Draft, at 91-92.
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special circumstances of the case make it appropriate, during
trial" 1 6
Upon a showing, supported by sworn affidavits, that the
requisite evidentiary standard has been satisfied, "the federal
magistrate shall issue an order requiring the person named in
the affidavit to appear at a designated time and place for non-
testimonial identification."'17 The order
shall be signed by the federal magistrate and shall state:(1) that the presence of the person named in the affidavit is
required for the purpose of permitting nontestimonial identifi-
cation procedures in order to aid in the investigation of the
offense specified therein;
(2) the time and place of the required appearance;
(3) the nontestimonial identification procedures to be con-
ducted, the methods to be used, and the approximate length of
time such procedures will require;
(4) the grounds to suspect that the person named in the affi-
davit committed the offense specified therein;
(5) that the person will be under no obligation to submit to any
interrogation or to make any statement during the period of his
appearance except for that required for voice identification;
(6) that the person may request the federal magistrate to make
a reasonable modification of the order with respect to time and
16. Rule 41.1(b), 52 F.R.D. at 463. The official comments state:
Subdivision (b) makes clear that the order may be requested
prior to arrest; between arrest and trial (see Lewis v. United
States, 382 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in which it is held that
the Mallory rule is not applicable to the taking of a handwriting
exemplar between arrest and initial appearance before the mag-
istrate); or where special circumstances exist, during trial.
This is consistent with the recommendation of the American
Bar Association Standards Relating to Discovery and Proce-
dure Before Trial § 3.1 (Approved Draft 1970), which provides
that the court may order such identification procedures "[n]ot-
withstanding the initiation of judicial proceedings .
52 F.R.D. at 469.
Rule 41.1 (k) further provides that
A person arrested for or charged with an offense may request
the federal magistrate to order a nontestimonial identification
procedure. If it appears that the results of specific nontesti-
monial identification procedures will be of material aid in de-
termining whether the defendant committed the offense, the
federal magistrate shall order the government to conduct such
identification procedure involving the defendant under such
terms and conditions as the federal magistrate shall prescribe.
Id. at 466. The official comments state:
Subdivision (k) gives the defendant an opportunity to also re-
quest the court to order the government to conduct a non-
testimonial identification procedure. It may, for example, be
in a defendant's interest to be in a properly conducted lineup
to check the accuracy of an eyewitness who is to testify
against him. There may be other identification procedures,
involving a defendant, which he may want conducted by the
government.
Id. at 471.
17. Rule 41.1(d), id. at 463.
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place of appearance, including a request to have any nontesti-
monial identification procedure other than a lineup conducted
at his place of residence; and
(7) that the person, if he fails to appear, may be held in con-
tempt of court.'s
A Rule 41.1 order
may be served by a federal law enforcement officer. The order
shall be served upon the person named or described in the affi-
davit by delivery of a copy to him personally. Service may be
had at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States.'"
Rule 41.1 (e) also provides that
[a]t the request of the person named in the affidavit, the fed-
eral magistrate shall modify the order with respect to time and
place of appearance whenever it appears reasonable under the
circumstances to do so. 2 0
Once the time and place of appearance have been determined,
Subdivision (i) further promotes the goal of minimal incon-
venience to the suspect:
No person who appears under an order of appearance issued
pursuant to this section shall be detained longer than neces-
sary to conduct the specified nontestimonial identification pro-
cedures unless he is arrested for an offense.21
18. Rule 41.1(h), id. at 464-65. The official comments state:
Subdivision (h) prescribes the contents of the order. It makes
clear that the court shall indicate the "procedures to be con-
ducted, the methods to be used, and the approximate length of
time such procedures will require." It is contemplated that
courts will, by rule or other means, use this authority to pursue
the objectives identified in United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218,
239 (1967), where the court said that there is need for
[1]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local po-
lice departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and
unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings * * *
and in Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir.
1968):
police require skillful and imaginative legal planning, bot-
tomed upon cooperative utilization, rather than utter disre-
gard, of judicial power, and designed to achieve legitimate
ends by means which have some appeal in terms of their
concern for statutory and constitutional protections.
See also AMERICAN LAW INSTUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § A 5.09 (3) (1968).
Subdivision (h) (5) is intended to make clear that the de-
fendant shall not be required to give testimonial evidence.
The rule, by its express terms, is limited to nontestimonial
identification procedures.
Id. at 470-71. See note 13 supra.
19. Rule 41.1(g), id. at 464.
20. 52 F.R.D. at 464. The official comments state: "Subdivision
(e) affords the suspect an opportunity to request modification of the
order where convenience to him makes such modification reasonable."
Id. at 470.
21. Id. at 465. The official comments state: "Subdivision (i) deals
with implementation of the nontestimonial identification order. It
stresses the fact that . . . any period of detention shall be as brief as
possible." Id. at 471.
PROPOSED CRIMINAL RULE 41.1
Subdivision (d) also stresses the fact that the detention shall be
as brief as possible: "After such identification procedures have
been completed, the person shall be released or charged with an
offense. 22
Whatever the results of the identification procedures, Sub-
division (j) provides:
Within forty-five days after the nontestimonial identification
procedure, a return shall be made to the federal magistrate who
issued the order setting forth an inventory of the products of
the nontestimonial identification procedures obtained from the
person named in the affidavit If, at the time of such return,
probable cause does not exist to believe that such person has
committed the offense named in the affidavit or any other of-
fense, the person named in the affidavit shall be entitled to
move that the federal magistrate issue an order directing that
the products of the nontestimonial identification procedures,
and all copies thereof, be destroyed. Such motion shall, ex-
cept for good cause shown, be granted.2 3
Given the lower standard necessary to procure these identifica-
tion tests, the express inclusion of a right to have the results
destroyed if probable cause is not established is well-consid-
ered.2 4 This right should be construed to include the complete
expurgation of any record of such detention, since the record
is susceptible to misinterpretation and misuse.25
22. Id. at 463.
23. Id. at 465-66. The official comments state:
Subdivision (j) provides for a return which shall set forth the
results of the identification procedures. If there is no prob-
able cause adequate to justify an instituting of a prosecution,
the person is entitled to a court order directing that the results
of the identification procedures be destroyed.
Id. at 471.
24. A person arrested without probable cause, or acquitted at trial
after a valid arrest, also appears to have this right:
There is, to say the least, serious question whether the Consti-
tution can tolerate any adverse use of information or tangible
objects obtained as the result of an unconstitutional arrest of the
individual concerned.... [I]t is hard to see how an arrest
not based on probable cause, followed by complete exoneration
of the person arrested ... could be used to support any adverse
inferences whatsoever regarding him.... [I]n consequence,
if appellant can show that his arrest was not based on probable
cause it is difficult to find constitutional justification for its
memorialization in the FBIrs criminal files.[E]ven if the arrest was made lawfully and with the best of
intentions, if the person arrested has been exonerated it is
difficult to see why he should be subject to continuing pun-
ishment by adverse use of his "criminal" record.
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 491-92, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnotes
omitted).
25. For example, companies which research the complete private
life of potential employees through the services of investigatory agen-
cies usually examine court records. This creates the possibility of in-
nuendo and resultant adverse effects to the suspect See Countryman,
1972]
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The rule provides that for "good cause shown" a motion
for destruction of the products of the tests may be denied.
Though such motions should be carefully considered by the
courts to prevent emasculation of this protective provision, sev-
eral situations might satisfy the "good cause" requirement.
First, good cause might be shown where a strong possibility
exists that sufficient evidence would be forthcoming in the im-
mediate future which would, in conjunction with the results
of the identification procedures, establish probable cause to
arrest.26 Another instance might include the situation where
the evaluation of the identification tests has been unavoidably
delayed, although in most instances 45 days should be ample
time for the complete evaluation of the products of the tests
provided for under Rule 41.1. This saving-of-the-evidence pos-
sibility may lessen the tendency to find probable cause to arrest
in close cases where in fact probable cause should not be found.
In these cases, especially where further evidence may be avail-
able in the near future, the magistrate may prefer to delay a
final decision on the probable cause to arrest issue until all pos-
sible evidence in the case has been introduced. The magistrate's
awareness that the identification evidence will not be destroyed
and the record expunged if in his discretion he finds "good
cause" may thus allow him valuable latitude in his determina-
tion of probable cause.2 T In cases where the good cause shown
is later rebutted or ceases to exist, the motion should be granted
immediately.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF RULE 41.1
1. The Standard of Evidence Required to Obtain
a Rule 41.1 Order
An examination of the constitutionality of the less than
The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Com-
puter, 49 TExAs L. REv. 837, 840 (1971).
26. In introducing a bill somewhat similar to Rule 41.1 in 1969,
Senator John L. McClellan expressed doubts about the utility of allow-
ing eradication of such evidence if probable cause to arrest was not
established. He felt that such a procedure might lead to picking up a
suspect more than once. 115 CONG. REc. 28896, 28899 (1969).
27. Where the requested procedures produce a positive identifica-
tion and probable cause to arrest is thereby clearly established, the
police may arrest the suspect immediately. However, in cases where
the issue remains in doubt even after the identification procedures are
completed, the police may prefer to have the magistrate determine the
existence of probable cause to arrest. It is at this point that the discre-
tion to deny the motion to destroy the products of the identification
procedures may play a significant role.
[Vol. 56:667
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probable cause standard embodied in Rule 41.128 necessarily
involves as a first step a review of the Fourth Amendment as it
has been construed by the Supreme Court. The Amendment
prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures and provides
that warrants shall issue only upon a showing of probable
cause.2 9 The "reasonableness clause" and the "warrants clause"
are independent safeguards, the first proscribing unreasonable
searches and seizures of any kind, and the second providing pro-
tection against abuse of the warrant procedure.3 0 It has been
suggested that these two clauses contain substantially identical
standards designed to protect personal liberty against unconsti-
tutional searches and seizures whether by warrant or other-
wise.31 This suggestion is supported by a recent summation
by the Supreme Court of its interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment:
In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon
probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable
search permitted by the Constitution. 32
However, the Fourth Amendment area is marked by con-
flicting decisions which "[n]o trick of logic will make . . . per-
fectly consistent."33 For example, a prior judicial determination
of the probable cause requirement through the warrant pro-
cedure is generally necessary to a reasonable search, but the
police will be allowed to make an independent determination of
probable cause in emergent circumstances, subject to judicial
review.34 Moreover, a review of the Fourth Amendment cases
fails to yield a definitive statement on the relationship between
"probable cause" and "reasonableness." This failure results
partially from the dichotomy between the warrant and nonwar-
rant procedure, and from the confusion which is seemingly inher-
ent in a case by case approach.35 However, the Court seems to
28. Rule 41.1(c) (2) defines the standard as "reasonable grounds,
not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the person
... committed the offense." 52 F.P.D. at 463. See text at note 41 infra.
29. See note 2 supra.
30. See 3. LANDnNsm] SEARCH AND SEIzuRE uAN T SuPREmE COURT,
42-43 (1966).
31. United States v. Bailey, 327 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. III. 1971).
32. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959).
33. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971).
34. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
35. United States v. Stoval, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), one commentator
notes, ". .. is an apt illustration of the preference for case-by-case
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
recognize that a determination of the constitutionality of a parti-
cular search or seizure necessitates a balancing of contending
individual and societal interests. Thus it can be persuasively
argued, as the Court stated in Camara v. Municipal Court,80 that
reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public
interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is prob-
able cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such
an approach . . . gives full recognition to the competing public
and private interests here at stake .... 37
This concept of reasonableness as the ultimate standard has
resulted in the proposition that probable cause to arrest is not
an absolute prerequisite to every conceivable interference with
personal liberty. Thus in Terry v. Ohio88 it was held that with-
out probable cause to arrest a police officer may make a self-
protective search for weapons of a person reasonably believed to
be dangerous. Since the warrant procedure is not involved here
the basis for the "frisk" is the reasonableness under all the cir-
cumstances of the action taken. The critical factor justifying
the "frisk" for weapons in Terry was the Court's concern for
the personal safety of the police officer in a confrontation with
a potentially dangerous suspect. In the absence of such com-
pelling considerations probable cause to arrest or to search is
generally necessary for a lawful restriction of one's personal
freedom.
The development which directly led to the Rule 41.1 stand-
ard was the recognition by the Davis Court of the difficulty
created for law enforcement officers by its holding that inves-
tigatory detentions are subject to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment. It recognized that the balancing of competing
interests which determines the reasonableness of a particular
search and seizure is also relevant to the amount of evidence
necessary to establish probable cause in a particular case. Thus,
the Davis Court thought,
It is arguable. . . that, because of the unique nature of the fin-
gerprinting process, . . .detentions [for fingerprinting] might,
under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with
the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable
cause in the traditional sense.39
evaluation in this area." Note, Regulation and Enforcement of Pre-trial
Identification Procedures, 69 COLUM. L. RLv. 1296, 1299 (1969).
36. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
37. Id. at 539 (citations omitted). Camara involved warrantless
housing code inspections, but this same language has been quoted in the
criminal context. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
38. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
39. 394 U.S. at 727.
[Vol. 56:667
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The Court's analysis of the "unique nature of the fingerprinting
process" supports the concept of balancing the interests of so-
ciety in crime prevention against the seriousness of the infringe-
ment upon one's personal liberty. Thus detentions for the sole
purpose of fingerprinting might not have to meet the traditional
probable cause standard because
[d]etention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less seri-
ous intrusion upon personal security than other types of police
searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the
probing into an individual's private life or thoughts that marks
an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be
employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police
need only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fin-
gerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-
solving tool than eye-witness identifications or confessions and
is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and the
"third degree." Finally, because there is no danger of destruc-
tion of fingerprints, the limited detention need not come unex-
pectedly or at an inconvenient time. For this same reason, the
general requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer
be obtained in advance of detention would seem not to admit
of any exception in the fingerprinting context 40
Proposed Rule 41.1 attempts to define the narrow circum-
stances suggested in Davis which would strike a balance be-
tween contending societal and individual interests. Rule 41.1 (c)
provides that a nontestimonial identification order shall issue
upon a showing:
(1) that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed;
(2) that there are reasonable grounds, not amounting to prob-
able cause to arrest, to suspect that the person named or des-
cribed in the affidavit committed the offense; and
(3) that the results of specific nontestimonial identification pro-
cedures will be of material aid in determining whether the per-
son named in the affidavit committed the offense.41
40. Id. at 727-28.
41. 52 F.R.D. at 463. The official comments state:
The "reasonable grounds to suspect" formulation is consistent
with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the language of
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 . . . (1969).... It is also
consistent with the decisions of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. See, e.g., United States v.
Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 197 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The third re-
quirement is that there be reason to believe that the identifica-
tion procedure will be of "material aid in determining whether
the person named in the affidavit committed the offense."
52 F.R.D. at 469-70.
The Federal District Court sitting in St. Paul, Minnesota, has
adopted the following rule:
It is ordered that the magistrates at St. Paul and Minnea-
polis are authorized to issue orders requiring the furnishing
of handwriting exemplars under the terms and conditions speci-
1972]
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Requirements (1) and (3) should present no great difficulty in
most cases. "[P]robable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed" should be construed as that quantum of evi-
dence necessary to establish probable cause as traditionally de-
fined, a concept with which the courts have long been familiar.
The term "material aid" ensures that the requested procedures
fled in Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
[December 13, 1971].
Rule 41.1 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
the taking of fingerprints upon a showing that:
(1) A known criminal offense has been committed; and(2) There is reason to believe that the fingerprinting of the
named or described individual will aid in the apprehension of
the unknown perpetrator of such criminal offense or that there
is reason to suspect that the named or described individual is
connected with the perpetration of the crime; and
(3) The fingerprints of the named or described individual are
not in the files of the agency employing the affiant.
COLO. R. CRi . P. (Oct. 1, 1969) (emphasis added). The events leading
to the adoption of the Colorado rule are related in Carrington, supra
note 9.
In 1969, Senator McClellan introduced a bill (proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 3507, S. 2997, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ) similar to proposed Rule
41.1. This bill would have provided for the issuance of a subpoena
for "identifying physical characteristics" upon a showing that:
(1) reasonable cause exists for belief that a specifically de-
scribed criminal offense punishable under a statute of the United
States by death or imprisonment for more than one year has
been committed;(2) procurement of evidence of identifying physical charac-
teristics from an identified or particularly described individual
may contribute to the identification of the individual who com-
mitted such offense; and(3) such evidence apparently cannot be obtained by the in-
vestigating officer from any investigative or law enforcement
agency of the United States, any State, or any political sub-
division of any State.
The bill is reprinted in L. HALL, Y. KAZMSAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDmU 58-59 (3d ed. 1970 Supp.), and in 115
CONG. REc. 28896, 28900 (1969), with the introductory remarks of Sena-
tor McClellan. Public hearings on the bill were held on March 10 and
11, 1970.
Arizona has adopted a statute which provides for the taking of
identification procedures similar to those available under proposed
Rule 41.1. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1424 (1971). The bill appears
to have been based upon proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3507, as the prerequisites
for the issuance of the court order pursuant to this statute are essen-
tially the same. Noticeably lacking from the formulation of the basis
for the issuance of the order both in this statute and in proposed
18 U.S.C. § 3507 is the requirement of cause to believe that the
person subject to the requested order committed the crime. This re-
quirement must be implied, however, and it is clear that, at least with
respect to 18 U.S.C. § 3507, something less than probable cause is re-
quired. See introductory remarks of Senator McClellan, 115 CoNG.
REc. 28896 (1969).
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have a legitimate purpose other than harassment, and in most
cases it should be obvious whether the identification tests will be
of "material aid." For example, a showing that a check has been
forged would clearly indicate that a handwriting exemplar
would be of material aid in determining whether the suspect
forged it.
The critical formulation here, "reasonable grounds, not
amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect," is an attempt
to articulate a standard of evidence consistent with the Fourth
Amendment,42 yet consisting of less than probable cause in the
traditional sense. This standard should in essence be viewed as
incorporating the concept of "variable probable cause."-4 3  In
Wise v. Murphy,44 a dissenting judge explained the difference
between this concept and probable cause as traditionally
defined:
Unlike our present concept where we focus on only one issue-
is there probable cause to believe the person is guilty of a crime
-. . . this test would call for the examination of a variety of
factors such as: the gravity of the crime; whether the police are
concerned mainly with detention rather than prevention; the
seriousness of the intrusion necessitated by the type of deten-
tion employed.... In essence, probable cause becomes one
of a number of factors balanced in a test to determine the
overriding standard of reasonableness.
42. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
43. The concept of variable probable cause is attributed to Justice
Jackson's dissent in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
The Rule 41.1 standard should be construed consistently with the sug-
gestion in Davis that traditional probable cause might not be necessary
for fingerprint detentions. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
This suggestion is susceptible to two interpretations. First, the Court
might simply have meant that if traditional probable cause requires
something more than a 50% probability in all cases it would now
accept a lower probability, perhaps 40%, without respect to the strength
of the competing interests present in each case. This interpretation
is inconsistent with the concept of variable probable cause. Second,
the Court might have been suggesting that rather than adhere to the
more mathematical probabilities traditionally associated with probable
cause, it would consider in each case all of the competing interests to
determine the overall reasonableness of a search or seizure. This would
support the utilization of the variable probable cause concept of Rule
41.1 and would appear to be the better interpretation. First, the Court
has been willing in several recent cases to explicitly adopt the bal-
ancing of interests approach used in the determination of variable
probable cause. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). Second, the Davis Court's
suggestion concerning fingerprinting was founded upon the same type
of analysis as that required for a finding of variable probable cause.
See text accompanying note 40 supra.
44. Wise v. Murphy (John Doe v. Murphy), 275 A.2d 205, 222-23
(D.C.C.A. 1971) (Fickling, A.J., in dissent) (footnotes omitted).
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Thus the term "reasonable grounds '' 45 encompasses the neces-
sary balancing of individual and societal interests inherent in a
finding of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. It
allows for a consideration of the limited nature of the detention
contemplated under Rule 41.1 and the concomitantly limited
infringement upon the personal liberty of the individual sus-
pect. The specific denial of the necessity for probable cause to
arrest assumes that the detention is of a lesser order than a for-
mal arrest. 46 This specific denial, in conjunction with the phrase
"reasonable grounds . . . to suspect," rejects the comparatively
rigid evidentiary standard traditionally associated with probable
cause to arrest. Thus Rule 41.1 would require not probable
cause to believe but rather, reasonable grounds to suspect. More
than a mere semantic distinction, this wording significantly
changes the substantive evidentiary showing necessary for a
lawful detention.
The relative novelty of the variable probable cause concept
requires an initial determination of its practical feasibility.
Although susceptible to deceptively simple definition, the con-
cept will likely prove to be exceptionally difficult and complex
in application. This would be especially true during the early
stages following its adoption. The rule states that less than
probable cause to arrest is sufficient but otherwise provides no
guidelines as to the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to
satisfy the "reasonable grounds to suspect" formulation. Of
particular difficulty will be situations where multiple suspects
are involved.
This problem is further complicated by the nature of vari-
able probable cause itself. The concept lacks the relatively
more tangible elements which constitute traditional probable
cause. The magistrate can no longer rely on mathematical
probabilities but must now consider in both abstract and con-
45. The term "reasonable grounds" in federal statutes has been
construed to be the substantial equivalent of "probable cause." See,
e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959).
46. This assumption may be of doubtful validity in certain in-
stances where a series of identification procedures is requested. For
example, in a rape case it is conceivable that all of the following tests
could be requested: blood, hair and voice samples, fingerprints and
lineups. Furthermore the magistrate may order that a suspect be
brought before him by force if necessary where it appears that he is
likely to alter or destroy the evidence or flee the jurisdiction. See
text accompanying note 112 infra. This is such a substantial deprivation
of personal liberty that at best only a tenuous distinction could be made
between this procedure and a "formal arrest."
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crete terms all of the conflicting societal and individual inter-
ests as well as the quantum of evidence shown in each case. He
is thus more likely than before to be persuaded by his own per-
sonal predilections and conceptions of justice. Thus the inevi-
table result of the utilization of the variable probable cause con-
cept is likely to be an uneven interpretation and application of
Rule 41.1. 47
2. Is Rule 41.1 Constitutional?
A determination of the constitutional validity of this lower
than probable cause to arrest standard involves three distinct
analytic situations: A Rule 41.1 order may be requested of (1)
an arrestee for purposes of identification for the crime for which
he was arrested; (2) an arrestee for purposes of identification
for crimes other than that for which he was arrested; and (3)
a suspect who is not yet in custody. Regarding the first situa-
tion, it is clear that if made after arrest or during trial, an order
to compel an arrestee to submit to nontestimonial identification
procedures pertinent to the crime for which he was arrested is
generally valid. The initial probable cause to arrest will in most
Rule 41.1 cases supply the necessary legal basis for a finding of
the reasonableness of the identification procedure or search.
Though as a general rule probable cause to arrest does not
establish probable cause to search, which must be independently
established,48 in certain cases the facts which constitute prob-
able cause to arrest concomitantly establish probable cause to
search. This occurs where the thrust of the known facts points
not only to a probable belief that a crime has been committed
and that the suspect committed it, but also that the evidence
sought is connected with that crime and will be discovered where
the search is to take place.49 The proper application of Rule 41.1
satisfies these conditions in its requirement that the identifica-
tion procedures be of "material aid" in determining whether or
not the suspect committed the crime. In most instances it should
be immediately apparent whether or not the requested test will
47. If such a procedure as Rule 41.1 is adopted at the state level,
the situation will be further complicated by the fact that state mag-
istrates are often not legally trained, or only informally so.
48. United States v. Bailey 327 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
49. This was recognized to be the case in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966), where the facts which constituted probable
cause to arrest for drunken driving also validated the taking of the
arrestee's blood sample even though the arresting officer made these
determinations without the aid of prior judicial authorization.
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materially aid in this determination. For example, it is clear
that a blood sample would materially aid in the identification of
a narcotic user and that a lineup would be of material aid in
identifying the perpetrator of a crime for which there is an eye-
witness. The same would be true of the other procedures avail-
able under Rule 41.1 in most cases.50
Regarding the second situation, innovative developments by
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals support the
proposition that a person lawfully arrested for one crime may
be compelled to submit to certain identification procedures for
other similar crimes for which there is no probable cause to
arrest. The court held in Adams v. United States51 that because
of an unnecessary delay in presentment to a magistrate when
promptness was required by Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,52 the products of a lineup obtained during
the delay53 were illegal and therefore inadmissible. 5 4 The court
went on to suggest, however, that
50. This does not mean, of course, that a Rule 41.1 order will or
should issue automatically in this context without a careful examination
of whether the requested procedure will be of material aid. It simply
means that requirements (1) and (2) of the standard are antecedently
satisfied by the initial lawful arrest and that also in many cases re-
quirement (3) ("material aid") will be easily satisfied due to the nature
of the procedures which may be requested under Rule 41.1.
51. 399 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
52. Rule 5 (a) provides in relevant part:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a
complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant
shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before
the nearest available commissioner [United States magistrate]
53. The defendants in Adams were lawfully arrested for an at-
tempted robbery of a liquor store, but were then held overnight and
placed in lineups to be viewed by witnesses to other liquor store rob-
beries. The conviction appealed from was that for the successful
robbery of a different liquor store than the one for which they were
originally arrested. Judge McGowan of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit stated that the delay in presentment was
caused by the fear that if immediately presented the suspect would be
immediately released on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of
1969 (18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (Supp. IV 1969) ). McGowan, Constitutional
Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235,
246 (1970).
54. In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Court
held that under Rule 5(a), confessions obtained by police after arrest
and before presentment to a magistrate without unnecessary delay are
inadmissible at trial. The purpose of presentment without unnecessary
delay is to provide the arrestee with judicial advisement of his rights,
including the right to counsel. Counsel must be appointed, absent
waiver, for his protection at any critical stage of the prosecution. In
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), it was held that lineups are
[Vol. 56:667
19721 PROPOSED CRIMINAL RULE 41.1 683
[o]nce brought under judicial authority by virtue of the pre-
sentment to a magistrate required by Rule 5 (a), the police could
invoke the aid of that authority to make the prisoner reasonably
available for line-up identification in respect of other crimes
for which there is less than probable cause to arrest.5
This lineup identification may be implemented by making
the arrestee's participation in the lineup "a condition of release,
by suspending the order of release, or by continuing the prelim-
inary hearing until the lineup is completed."50  Thus in United
States v. Stevenson 7 the appellant was arrested for robbery of
a sandwich shop and pursuant to an "Adams order" was com-
pelled to stand in a lineup to be viewed by witnesses to other
crimes for which there was no probable cause to arrest. A wit-
ness to the robbery of a service station identified him and he
was convicted of armed robbery.
58
Implicit in the Adams order cases is the assumption that
it is not improbable that a person involved in a specific type of
crime may be connected with other crimes having a similar
modus operandi.59 The validity of this assumption is at least
such "critical stages" necessitating the right to counsel. But cf. the
applicability of the Mallory rule to the taking of handwriting exemplars
before presentment, supra note 16.
55. 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
56. Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The court also stated:
[I]n a case in which the arrest was made on probable cause
but further investigation clouds the issue, the [magistrate's]
power to provide for a lineup can be justified, without regard to
other reasons that may be found, as part of a process of ob-
taining the fullest information possible before making his ruling
on the issue of further detention.
The official comments to proposed Rule 41.1 state:
This has become known in the District of Columbia as the
"Adams Order." See United States v. Alien, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Judicial authorization has been given to
require a suspect to appear in a lineup [United States v. Allen,
supra]; to require the suspect to have fingerprints and palm
prints taken [Shaykar v. Curran, No. 24826 (1971)]; and to
take hair samples [Shaykar v. Curran, supra]. [The interim
order in Shaykar has been quoted in full in Wise v. Murphy
(John Doe v. Murphy), 275 A.2d 205, 214-15 n.22 (D.C.C-.A
1971).]
52 F.R.D. at 468.
57. 443 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Ran-
dolph, 443 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Young v. United States, 435 F.2d
405 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
58. The court had earlier stated that the right to counsel at line-
ups, required by United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218 (1967), must also be
available under the Adams order. Since appellant's counsel for the
original arrest was present at the lineups, the conviction was upheld.
59. The court stated in Adams that
[t]he facts of life with respect to liquor store robberies in this
community today suggest that there may be a not improbable
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questionable even if the scope of the "similar modus operandi"
requirement is carefully restricted."' Perhaps influencing the
court's adoption of the similar modus operandi rationale is the
thought that once an individual has lost his liberty through a
valid arrest it is not necessary or meaningful to require probable
cause to infringe upon a freedom which no longer exists. As
Chief Justice Warren Burger argued in his concurring opinion
in Adams,
The matter of placing one in a lineup when he is already
in detention-whether temporarily under arrest or confined
under a long sentence in a prison-is not the same as arresting
a suspect off the street or from his home. The former is not
being deprived of his liberty when placed in a lineup .... The
reason for requiring probable cause for an arrest is to protect
against arbitrary interference with liberty. When the condi-
tion of custody already exists, however, the constitutional re-
quirement of an arrest on probable cause would be totally
superfluous-a sheer ritual serving no legitimate protective
function.62
To the extent, if any, that this argument assumes as a pre-
requisite some rational nexus between the crime for which the
person was arrested and the identification procedure requested,
it is perhaps justifiable.0 3 But the District of Columbia Circuit
connection between some of those robberies and persons caught
in the act of fleeing from an abortive attempt to rob a liquor
store.
399 F.2d at 578.
60. Judge McGowan has been told that the Adams order has
helped the police solve many "open" or unsolved crimes. McGowan,
supra note 53, at 248. It might be intuitively thought that this assump-
tion is correct, but considering the fundamental nature of this
premise with respect to the Adams order cases, certainly empirical
studies on this issue are necessary before it can be accepted at face
value.
61. In United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the
court in upholding an Adams order relied upon what it said was the
lower court's careful inquiry into the matter of modus operandi and
its explicit finding that in fact similar crimes were involved.
62. 399 F.2d at 580-81.
63. The Chief Justice's argument seems nevertheless overstated.
Surely the concept of liberty encompasses more than merely not being
confined within prison walls. The prisoner, as well as the man at
liberty, possesses the right to be free from government edicts which
direct him to do things for which the government has no legitimate
purpose. And the purpose of solving crime by the utilization of com-
pelled lineups becomes illegitimate when no rational connection can
be shown between the person in custody and the probability that he
committed the crime for which he will be displayed in public. Thus,
unless the Adams court can empirically demonstrate that the probabil-
ity that one who commits a particular crime may also be involved in
other similar crimes-rather than relying upon what presently appears
to be an intuitive major premise-the constitutionality of this procedure
must remain in doubt.
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seems to have allowed the originally narrow premise of Adams,
which involved a person arrested for robbery of a liquor store
who was placed in lineups for other liquor store robberies, to
be expanded. Robberies of commercial establishments consid-
ered as a generic class apparently now satisfy the requirement
of a similar modus operandi.64 Basing the Adams order lineups
upon the tenuous link between a person arrested for one crime
and the probability that he is involved in other similar crimes
can be justified, if at all, only when the suspect is already in cus-
tody and the concept of similar modus operandi is carefully
delineated. Nevertheless, Adams and its companion cases sup-
port the less than probable cause to arrest standard of Rule 41.1
with respect to a request for an identification order for similar
crimes other than the one for which the suspect was arrested.65
Finally, a Rule 41.1 order may be requested to compel a
suspect not yet in custody to submit to nontestimonial identifi-
cation procedures on less than probable cause to arrest. In
64. For example, in United States v. Stevenson, 443 F.2d 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), a person arrested for armed robbery of a sandwich shop was
compelled to stand in a lineup for a crime involving the armed rob-
bery of a service station.
'65. The official comments to the proposed rule further state that the
Adams order cases support the idea that a suspect not yet in custody
may also be compelled to stand in lineups on less than probable cause
to arrest:
In giving judicial authorization to place a suspect in a lineup,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has indicated
that such authorization could be given as to a suspect not yet
under arrest and as to whom there was no probable cause ade-
quate to justify an arrest. See United States v. Greene, 429
F.2d 193, 197 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1970): "Approximately one year af-
ter Wade, the Supreme Court for the first time held that prob-
able cause to arrest is not an indispensable condition to every
conceivable police restraint of personal liberty. [Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1.] After that, the Court, in Davis v. Mississippi, [394
U.S. 721], threw out the idea that a suspect perhaps could, underjudicial supervision, be compelled to submt himself to finger-
print examinations."
52 F.R.D. at 468. Wise v. Murphy (John Doe v. Murphy), 275 A.2d 205,
214 n.21 (D.C.C.A. 1971), supports the official comments' analysis:
It is significant that ... the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia obviously also had in mind a de-
fendant who was released by the magistrate under the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 et seq. In the case of a
bailed defendant, as in this case, the contemplated court-or-
dered lineup entails brief detention of the person then at lib-
erty. Although the opinion of the court did not discuss the con-
stitutionality of such limited detention absent grounds for formal
arrest, it is certain that the court contemplated persons at
liberty being ordered into a lineup on less grounds for formal
arrest. It would seem that if constitutional doubts regarding
such recommended procedure existed the suggestion would not
have been made.
-19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
terms of effective aid to law enforcement officers at the investi-
gatory stage and the important constitutional issues it sharply
presents, this is the most significant and troublesome category.
Apparently the only case6" which has considered the validity of
this proposition is Wise v. Murphy.67 In Wise, which involved
an alleged rape at knifepoint, the victim was shown photographs
of possible suspects, one of which she stated had facial features
similar to those of the man who attacked her. However, she
could not make a positive identification without seeing the sus-
pect in person. The issue then, was whether the suspect could
be compelled to stand in a lineup absent facts constituting prob-
able cause to arrest. The court ruled in the affirmative. 8
The basis for the decision was two-fold. First, although the
court recognized that a compelled lineup was a "seizure" of a
person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it stated
that the seizure did not amount to a "formal arrest." Second,
the court held that the relevant standard was thus not probable
cause to arrest, but rather the reasonableness of the detention
contemplated under all the facts and circumstances of the case.
The technical distinction 69 the court drew between a formal
arrest and a detention for a lineup is supported by the decision
of the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, which differentiated
between a formal arrest and a "stop and frisk. '7 0  The substan-
66. Consideration has been given this proposition at other levels,
however, including court-adopted rules for criminal procedure, pro-
posed legislation and a statute adopted in 1971. See note 41 supra.
67. (John Doe v. Murphy), 275 A.2d 205 (D.C.C.A. 1971) (The
appeal of Wise was dropped and the case discusses only the appeal of
"John Doe," so termed because the court felt that the lower than prob-
able cause to arrest standard demanded the preservation of the suspect's
anonymity in the event probable cause to arrest could not subsequently
be established).
68. The case was remanded, however, for further evidentiary
hearings.
69. Fickling, A.J., in dissent, made the following comments:
Despite the fact that detention and arrest may not be synony-
mous, to assert that the detention contemplated by the lineup
order is not an arrest is to participate in semantic nonsense.
It would appear that, at the least, two factors must be present
before a distinction from an arrest could be justified: (1) the
time involved must be extremely brief, and (2) it must involve
a stop rather [than] an affirmative command to move some-
where else. Within these narrow confines, it is conceivable
that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard might
be satisfied.
275 A.2d at 224 (footnotes omitted).
70. An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon
individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the
interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite differ-
ent. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution.
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tive difference between an arrest and a compelled lineup may
be difficult to grasp in some instances,7 1 but the distinction
nevertheless seems to be generally valid. A formal arrest initi-
ates a process that may deprive a person of his freedom for an
indeterminate length of time and generally results in the prose-
cution of the person at trial. A detention for lineups or the
other procedures available under Rule 41.1, while restricting
one's liberty, does so only briefly. If probable cause to arrest is
not established, the suspect must be immediately released.
The distinction between an arrest and a detention for a
lineup has the advantage of permitting the court to found its
decision upon the ultimate standard of reasonableness rather
the probable cause standard traditionally required in the arrest
context. In finding that the compelled lineup was reasonable
absent probable cause to arrest, the Wise court considered the
following factors: (1) the seriousness of the crime of rape;72
(2) the lack of feasible alternatives left to the police after
Davis;73 and (3) the limited nature of the detention contem-
plated.74 Moreover, the court was demonstrably careful to mini-
mize the inconvenience to the suspect and to maximize the pro-
tection of his constitutional rights," even to the extent of pro-
It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws
obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interfer-
ence with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not
trial conviction ultimately follows.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). But cf. Henry v. United States,
361U.S. 98 (1959).
71. See note 46 supra.
72. Grave reservations exist, however, as to whether this type
of court-ordered lineup, not connected with a formal arrest,
may be used constitutionally in other than serious felonies in-volving grave personal injuries or threats of the same. The
governmental interest, though serious, is not of the same mag-
nitude in commercial crimes involving property or money suchas forgery or false pretenses or other less serious ofens....
In such cases it is highly likely that the governmental interests
in law enforcement cannot outweigh the right of liberty, or
freedom from being ordered into even the most antiseptic
lineup, under circumstances short of traditional probable cause
for formal arrest.
275 A.2d at 216.
73. Id. at 213.
74. This same balancing process led the court in People v. Morales.
22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968), to hold that police
can temporarily detain a suspect for questioning concerning a particu-
larly heinous murder on less than probable cause to arrest after advise-
ment of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In Morales v. New
York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969), the Supreme Court declined to consider the
question of the constitutionality of temporary detentions for questioning
on less than probable cause to arrest grounds.
75. The court directed, or counsel agreed at oral argument, that
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viding for direct appeal prior to implementation of the lineup
order.7 16 The Wise court "conclude [d] that court-ordered lineups
predicated on reasonable grounds short of a basis for formal arrest
can be squared with the Fourth Amendment . . ."77 However,
the quantum of evidence which the court felt necessary to con-
stitute "reasonable grounds" is unclear since the case was re-
manded for more particularized findings to determine the basis
on which the police decided to show the photographs of several
suspects, including those of the petitioner, to the victim. 7  The
case is nonetheless significant for its explicit holding that prob-
able cause to arrest is not a prerequisite to a valid court-ordered
lineup and its resulting support for proposed Rule 41.1.
D. THE NONTESTIMONIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES OF RULE 41.1
The concept of variable probable cause employed by the Wise
court necessarily entails in each case an analysis of the particular
identification procedure requested under Rule 41.1. It was this
very type of analysis of the "unique nature of the fingerprinting
process" which led the Davis Court to suggest that with prior
judicial approval a lower standard than probable cause as tradi-
tionally defined might justify a brief investigatory detention
for fingerprinting purposes. However, proposed Rule 41.1 would
expand the scope of acceptable identification procedures to in-
clude:
fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood
specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples, or
other reasonable physical or medical examinations, handwriting
exemplars, voice samples, photographs, and lineups. 70
The inclusion of these additional procedures compels an exam-
ination of the reasons which led the Davis Court to its conclu-
the following safeguards would be provided the suspect: (1) far
greater magnitude than usual in his discovery; (2) victim's and wit-
ness' descriptions of the alleged perpetrator of the crime prior to the
lineup; (3) the right to interview the victim and witnesses prior to
lineup; (4) a record of all statements at the lineup; (5) lineup photo-
graphs and a record of the names and addresses of all participants for
future reconstruction of lineup if necessary; (6) protection of his per-
sonal security by not using prisoners or other suspects in lineup; and
(7) prohibition of official use of products of lineup for other purposes.
275 A.2d at 207-08.
76. Id. at 211.
77. Id. at 208.
78. The dissenting judges disagreed on what standard the majority
was applying. One stated that an "articulable suspicion" was sufficient,
while the other felt the majority was requiring a showing approaching
traditional probable cause to arrest. Id. at 221, 228.
79. 52 F.R.D. at 466-67.
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sion regarding the lowered evidentiary standard possibly accept-
able in the fingerprinting context in order to determine whether
these additional tests might also be constitutionally acceptable
under that lowered standard. Davis considered the following
generalized criteria relevant to a determination of the reason-
ableness of the fingerprinting process:80 (1) the degree to which
the procedure intrudes into the private life and thought of the
individual; (2) the opportunity for harassment inherent in the
nature of the procedure; (3) the intrinsic reliability of the pro-
cedure; and (4) the destructibility of the evidence sought, which
determines (5) the possibility of inconvenience to the suspect
and allows for (6) the opportunity to procure prior judicial
authorization of the procedures.
The nature of the variable probable cause standard dictates
that all of the factors deemed relevant by the Davis Court with
respect to fingerprinting, in addition to such factors as the grav-
ity of the offense involved and the possibility that the evidence
might not otherwise be available, must be considered in the con-
text of the procedural safeguards demonstrably present in Rule
41.1: in every instance prior judicial authorization must be
obtained; the suspect may request a reasonable modification of
the time and place for taking the tests, even to the extent of
having them conducted in his home; the detention shall be
as brief as possible; and, if probable cause to arrest is not estab-
lished, the record of such detention shall be destroyed upon
motion. The balanced structure of Rule 41.1 thus approximates
as close as is reasonably possible the carefully delineated cir-
cumstances suggested in Davis. The taking of fingerprints
pursuant to Rule 41.1 then would seem clearly to be permissible
on less than probable cause to arrest grounds.8' It seems equally
clear that palm prints and footprints should be similarly
treated.82
Several other procedures should also be considered to be
rather clearly within the ambit of the Davis suggestion. Phys-
ical measurements violate none of the criteria discussed in
80. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
81. The criminal files of the F.B.I. contained over 18 million finger-
prints as of May, 1969, and the civil files over 65 million. 115 CONG.
REc. 28896, 28898 (1969) (comments of Senator McClellan, in introducing
bill similar to proposed Rule 41.1). See note 41 supra.
82. Palm prints and footprints are equated with fingerprints with
respect of reliability: "any ridged areas of the hand or foot is (sic]
unique in every person and can be identified exactly like fingerprints
and such identifications have the same legal validity." Id. at 28898.
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Davis to such an extent as to meaningfully distinguish them
from fingerprints. Hair samples and handwriting exemplars8 8
also are largely consistent with the criteria established in Davis.
Neither of these procedures would intrude into the private life
or thought of a suspect and each is sufficiently reliable.84 The
danger that a suspect would in some manner "destroy" his hair
is surely negligible and thus both these procedures would seem
to admit of no emergency circumstances which would necessitate
their execution at an inconvenient time. Although it is con-
ceivable that there exists an opportunity for harassment with
respect to hair samples and handwriting exemplars through
repeated requests for these procedures, this threat is not that
persuasive in view of the requirement of prior judicial authori-
zation of Rule 41.1 orders.
However, it is questionable whether the other procedures
of Rule 41.1 should be permitted without a showing of evidence
closely approximating probable cause to arrest. Blood, saliva
and urine specimens are probably borderline cases here, though
their reliability when executed correctly is probably sufficient
to satisfy one of the Davis criteria. Their validity upon grounds
less than probable cause to arrest will depend upon the varying
factual contexts in which the requests for such procedures are
made. In many cases the time element would not be critical
and there would be no need for an immediate testing which
would inconvenience the suspect. For example, where a blood
specimen is sought to determine a suspect's blood type, it would
be possible to arrange a mutually convenient time and place to
take the test. Time would be a critical factor, however, where
the purpose of the test is to determine the existence of a chem-
ical agent such as a narcotic in the person's body which dis-
sipates over time. In this case, the convenience of the suspect
would very likely be sacrificed in light of the need for immediate
testing. A request for a urine or saliva sample would almost
always occur in this context. Requests for blood, urine and
saliva samples further provide the opportunity for harassment,
unlike fingerprints which need be taken but once.
83. A federal district court has already adopted proposed Rule 41.1
with respect to handwriting exemplars. See note 41 supra.
84. These are scientific procedures of recognized reliability and
if a proper foundation is laid, an expert may testify with respect to
them. See, e.g., State v. Post, 255 Iowa 573, 123 N.W.2d 11 (1963)
(hair); State v. Fisher, 242 Ore. 419, 410 P.2d 216 (1966) (handwriting
analysis compared to fingerprinting). See also text accompanying
note 101 infra.
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A more serious objection to these procedures is the neces-
sarily intrusive nature of the testing method, especially in the
case of blood specimens. Rule 41.1 (i) attempts to minimize this
factor by providing:
Blood tests shall be conducted under medical supervision, and
the federal magistrate may require medical supervision for any
other test ordered pursuant to this section when he deems such
supervision necessary.8 5
The Davis Court did not discuss searches which involve pene-
trations into a suspect's person. However, the Court has pre-
viously recognized that "[t]he integrity of an individual's per-
son is a cherished value of our society."80  It would seem that
this cherished societal interest in that integrity should not per-
mit personal intrusions on grounds amounting to less than tra-
ditional probable cause.
The taking of voice samples is also questionable, but for
different reasons. The main objection here concerns their reli-
ability. Whether the samples are to be used for identification
by a witness listening to them, visual analysis of a voiceprint or
by purely mechanical means, their reliability is suspect.8 7 The
most dependable of these methods seems to be normal aural
perception, 8 but aural comparisons decrease rapidly in reliability
over time,89 making time a factor here also. Apparently no
federal court,90 and only one state court,9 1 has accepted such
tests for use in establishing probable cause for arrest or deemed
them sufficiently probative to be admissible at trial.9- In this
context the New Jersey Supreme Court has argued that
85. 52 F.R.D. at 465. The official comments state: "Subdivision
(i) deals with implementation of the nontestimonial identification order.
It stresses the fact that certain tests will require competent medical
supervision.. . ." Id. at 471. Proper medical supervision of the taking
of blood specimens is required moreover by Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
86. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
87. See M. HEcKar, SPEAKER REcOGNMON: Ax INTERaRwr E SuRvuv
or TaE Lmr mTuRz (ASHA Monographs, No. 16, 1971).
88. Id. at 2, 73, 99.
89. Id. at 47. Typically there would be no tape recordings to
compare orally, but rather the victim's recollection of the voice at the
time of the crime would be the basis of comparison.
90. But see United States v. Wainwright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37
CALMR. 447 (1967) (voiceprints admissible in general court martial).
91. The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Trimble v. Hedman,
192 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1971), that voiceprint analysis is competent
evidence to establish probable cause and that it ought to be also ad-
missible at trial for the purposes of impeachment.
92. It was stated in People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 460,
72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 493 (1968), that the expert witness'
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before an intrusion into a person's privacy can be proper within
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, the product
of the search must have the capacity to be admissible in evi-
dence.93
If admissibility at trial can be considered sufficient indication
of the procedure's reliability, then voice samples compared
aurally might qualify here since such evidence is admissibleY'
However, it is doubtful that reliability by itself will be a deci-
sive factor. Voice samples seem to satisfy the other factors
considered important in Davis. Their reliability then would
be merely one of the many factors included in the determina-
tion of variable probable cause.
Thus in certain factual situations voice samples may properly
be compelled on less than probable cause to arrest. Such might
be the case where a police officer is sent to a home in response
to a telephoned plea for help and is shot by a sniper upon his
arrival,9 5 or in the case of a telephone bomb threat. Here a
recording of the telephone call might conceivably be the only
available evidence. Although the voice sample might never be
admitted at trial, to the extent that it narrows the scope of
investigation by eliminating possible suspects it would be very
helpful. In certain cases, the voice sample could be taken by
simply calling the suspect at his home and recording the ensu-
ing conversation,9 6 surely a minimal inconvenience. Under
admission that his process is entirely subjective and founded on
his opinion alone without general acceptance within the scien-
tific community compels us to rule "voiceprint" identification
process has not reached a sufficient level of scientific cer-
tainty to be accepted as identification evidence in cases where
the life or liberty of a defendant may be at stake.
93. State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 351, 230 A.2d 384, 388 (1967).
94. United States v. Moia, 251 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1958).
95. These were the facts in Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432
(Minn. 1971).
96. It is not certain whether this procedure would even require au-
thorization pursuant to Rule 41.1. Two considerations are relevant
here: (1) the procedure does not require an antecedent detention of
the suspect as do the other identification tests, with the exception of
photographs which may be taken from a distance; and (2) since no
"seizure" of the suspect is involved the relevance of Rule 41.1 depends
upon whether this procedure can be classified a "search." Such a
procedure does invade the privacy of the suspect and thus may re-
quire a legal basis equivalent to probable cause (or "reasonable
grounds") to sustain it as a valid search or as a permissible invasion
of privacy. However, the analogy which can be drawn from recent
wiretapping and electronic surveillance cases would seem to indicate
that it may be constitutionally permissible to telephone a suspect and
record the ensuing conversation under these circumstances. It ap-
pears from these cases that a government agent may with permission
enter a suspect's home and either record his conversation or transmit
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these circumstances, an order to compel voice samples based
upon grounds not amounting to probable cause to arrest might
well be justified.
Much of the crime which most concerns the public can only
be solved by eyewitness identification. 1 Lineups are thus an
essential investigatory technique. However, it is also true that
one of the major causes of incorrect verdicts is eyewitness mis-
identification.9 8 The Davis Court stated that fingerprinting
might be permissible on less than traditional probable cause
grounds because it is "not subject to such abuses as the im-
proper lineup."9 9  The Supreme Court in Wade v. United
States'0 0 also thought the potential for unduly suggestive lineups
so great as to classify the lineup as a "critical stage" of the trial
process necessitating the right to effective assistance of counsel.
There the Court again emphasized the intrinsic unreliability of
nonscientific identification procedures compared to such analytic
techniques as those applicable to fingerprints, blood samples,
clothing and hair. 10 ' However, Wade also suggested that care-
ful regulation of the procedures used at lineups through rules
specifically designed to minimize improper suggestiveness could
possibly eliminate the basis for regarding lineups as a "critical"
stage of the trial process.102
Rule 41.1 (h) specifically empowers the court to develop
procedural safeguards consistent with the Wade suggestion in
an effort to minimize the possibility of an improperly sugges-
tive lineup.103 Nonetheless, these commendable efforts do not
reach the core issue of the inherent unreliability of eyewitness
identification. The emotional stress which attends the wit-
nessing of a crime distorts one's perception, and while proced-
ural safeguards may minimize this danger, they cannot elim-
inate it. 04 Moreover, the period of time necessary to conduct
it electronically to other officers, and the evidence so obtained vio-
lates neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendments. See United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
97. For example, robberies, house-breakings, and street assaults.
98. Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
99. 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
100. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
101. Id. at 227-28.
102. Id. at 239.
103. See note 18 supra.
104. Where photographs are sought for the same purpose, they would
seem to be subject to much the same infirmities as the lineup with
respect to suggestiveness. Fickling, A.J., dissenting in Wise, stated:
The Court stressed the scientific reliability of that [finger-
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the lineup is considerably longer than that required for the
other procedures included in the rule. The inherent infirmi-
ties in a lineup should dictate that a suspect not be subjected
to one without a showing of probable cause.10
E. THE SANCTION FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT ORDER
In addition to the type of identification procedure requested,
the sanction which implements Rule 41.1 is an important ele-
ment in the matrix that determines the reasonableness of the
rule. Subdivision (f) provides:
Any person who fails without adequate excuse to obey an order
to appear served upon him pursuant to this section may be held
in contempt of the court which issued the order or, in the event
that the order was issued by a United States Magistrate, may be
held in contempt of the district court of the district in which
the magistrate is sitting.10 6
This sanction'0 7 would seem to be most effective against the
print] evidence plus the relatively slight intrustion upon per-
sonal security. This technique was expressly distinguished
from eyewitness identification. It is not that lineups are less
scientific than fingerprints; rather, they are not scientific at
all. Perhaps a more significant distinction between the two
processes is the character of the detention. Fingerprints can be
taken anywhere in a matter of minutes. Lineups, however, nec-
essarily involve more time ....
275 A.2d at 225.
105. But see Biehunik v. Felicette, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1971),
where it was held that police officers could be compelled to stand in a
lineup on less than probable cause grounds where one of their number
had been accused of police brutality and unlawful conduct. The court
based its decision upon the rationale of the "substantial public interest
in ensuring the appearance and actuality of police integrity." Id. at
230.
106. Rule 41.1, 52 F.R.D. at 464. The official comments state:
Subdivision (f) prescribes a sanction-contempt of court-for
failure to comply with the order. See United States v. Ham-
mond, 419 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1969), in which a conviction of
criminal contempt is sustained following a refusal by defendant
to comply with a court order to appear in a lineup. The refer-
ence to contempt of a United States magistrate is in accord
with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (d) (Supp. V, 1969).
Id. at 470.
107. The contempt sanction may be either criminal or civil. It is
criminal if it is imposed to punish the defendant and vindicate the
court's authority; it is civil if its purpose is to coerce a recalcitrant
party into compliance with the court order. Cliett v. Hammonds, 305
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962). The alleged contemnor must have notice of
the order which must be specific and definite. See text accompany-
ing note 18 supra. Criminal contempt additionally requires that the
alleged contemnor have a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the
right to counsel and the right to testify and call witnesses by way of
defense or explanation. In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1967);
Yates v. United States, 316 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1963); FED. R. CruM. P.,
Rule 42.
[Vol. 56:667
PROPOSED CRIMINAL RULE 41.1
innocent and those for whom the contempt sentence would
likely be harsher than that of the crime for which they are
sought to be convicted.10 8 Contempt of court may be the only
sanction available to force compliance with the court order in
some cases. For example, an especially obstinate suspect might
refuse to give a voice sample or a handwriting exemplar. Short
of actual torture, 0 9 punishment for contempt might be the only
way to effect compliance with a Rule 41.1 order.110
Where the suspect is likely to flee or to alter or destroy"1'
the evidence, the need to procure an immediate testing should
arguably invest law enforcement officers with the right to
prevent such an occurrence by reasonable means. Subdivision
(d) thus provides:
If it appears from the affidavit that a person named or des-
108. An "offense" under Rule 41.1(l) (1) is classified as one punish-
able by more than one year in prison. 52 F.R.D. at 466. It has been
said that "[p]unisbment of criminal contempt should reflect the 'least
possible power adequate to the end proposed.'" United States v.
Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1110 (7th Cir. 1970). Contempt sentences of
greater than one year have been upheld in the following cases: United
States v. Bukowski, supra (3 years reduced to 18 months); United States
v. Sternman, 433 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1970) (3 years); Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) (suspended sentence of five years but with
probation for five years). Sentences imposing imprisonment for
more than six months for criminal contempt must be accompanied by ajury trial or an intelligent waiver thereof. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
109. Due process, of course, prohibits anything approaching the
rack and screw. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See in
this connection Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966),
where the relationship between testimonial evidence protected by the
Fifth Amendment and nontestimonial identification procedures is dis-
cussed:
[Testimonial] incriminating evidence may be an unavoidable
by-product of the compulsion to take the test, especially for an
individual who fears the extraction [of blood] or opposes it on
religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to submit to
such attempts to discover evidence, the State may have to forgo
the advantage of any testimonial products of administering
the test-products which would fall within the privilege. In-
deed, there may be circumstances in which the pain, danger, or
severity of an operation would almost inevitably cause a person
to prefer confession to undergoing the "search," and nothing
we say today should be taken as establishing the permissibility
of compulsion in that case.
110. Each refusal to comply with a court order is a punishable of-
fense, however, and there thus seems to be no due process limitation
in this respect. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
111. It would be a question of interpretation whether the passive
destruction of a chemical agent in the blood would qualify here.
This might well be the case since none of the evidence available under
the procedures other than blood, saliva and urine specimens seems
capable of destruction.
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cribed in the affidavit may, upon service of the order to appear,
either flee or alter or destroy the nontestimonial evidence, the
federal magistrate may direct a marshal or other federal law
enforcement officer to bring the person before the federal mag-
istrate. The federal magistrate shall then direct that the desig-
nated nontestimonial identification procedures be conducted ex-
peditiously.' 12
However, it was thought in Davis that detentions for finger-
printing might be permitted on less than probable cause grounds
for two reasons which are pertinent here. First, the finger-
printing procedure does not intrude upon the personal security
of an individual to the same extent as other types of searches
and seizures. Second, because fingerprints are "indestructible,"
no emergent circumstances would necessitate an unexpected
and inconvenient seizure of the individual. 113 Thus to allow
officers to apprehend a suspect, presumably even in the middle
of the night, and take him before a magistrate by force if neces-
sary, contradicts the basic rationale of Davis. This procedure
could be as aggravating to the individual as any conceivable
search which under present law requires a strict showing of
probable cause. Thus, in each instance in which a Rule 41.1
request is made, it would appear that the magistrate would be
required to determine the likelihood that the suspect will flee
or alter or destroy the evidence"" prior to his determination
of whether there exists "reasonable grounds to suspect" that
the person named in the affidavit committed the offense. In
this manner, the magistrate's awareness of the type and manner
of the seizure contemplated will enable him to make a more
intelligent and comprehensive determination of whether the
ultimate standard of reasonableness is satisfied by the quantum
of evidence shown in each case. The necessarily intrusive and
unexpected nature of this procedure, as well as its potential for
abuse, are persuasive reasons for requiring a showing of noth-
112. 52 F.R.D. at 463. The official comments state:
Subdivision (d) prescribes the procedure for issuing the non-
testimonial identiication order, including provision for con-
ducting the idenification procedure where there are grounds
for believing that the suspect will flee or destroy the evidence.
Id. at 470.
113. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
114. Some of the factors utilized by courts in determining the right
to, and amount of, bail of an arrestee may be relevant here on the
issue of whether the suspect is likely to flee the jurisdiction: (1) the
nature of the offense; (2) the seriousness of the punishment: and
(3) the character and reputation of the suspect. Christoffel v. United
States, 196 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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ing less than probable cause to arrest as a basis for such an
order. Nevertheless, magistrates in their individual judgment
may decide to issue a Rule 41.1 order in these circumstances on
less than probable cause to arrest. This possibility raises the
further issue of whether physical force may be employed to
procure identification evidence once a suspect who was found
likely to flee or alter or destroy the evidence has been brought
before the magistrate. Once such a suspect is in custody, Sub-
division (d) provides that "[t]he federal magistrate shall then
direct that the nontestimonial identification procedures be con-
ducted expeditiously." A reasonable inference from this lan-
guage might be that the "expeditious" execution of the tests may
include the exercise of reasonable force where necessary. The
rationale here is that the possibility of the suspect fleeing or
destroying the evidence is sufficient to invest the government
with the right to physically compel the production of the evi-
dence.
This interpretation is unacceptable on two grounds. First,
an interpretation of this provision consistent with the general
scheme of Rule 41.1 would preclude the use of force under these
circumstances. Where a suspect is not likely to flee or destroy
the evidence the only express sanction provided for under Rule
41.1 for noncompliance with the court order is contempt of
court. Moreover, the only substantive distinction between such
a suspect and one who is likely to flee or destroy the evidence
disappears once the latter is in custody. Upon presentment to
a magistrate, the suspect may refuse to comply with the court
order. He may then be arrested for contempt of court, and since
once arrested he obviously could not flee the jurisdiction, mea-
sures could be taken to prevent destruction of the evidence. Thus
any difference in treatment between the two types of suspects
can not reasonably be jusitified once the suspect is in custody.
Finally, such a procedure would appear to be invalid under
the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of probable cause.
Not only would the suspect be taken by force before the magis-
trate but he would also be subject to a forcible extraction of
the evidence. The nature of this procedure is necessarily so
intrusive upon human dignity that no subtle distinction between
this and a formal arrest can be permitted. As such, probable
cause to arrest must be considered a constitutional prerequisite
to both a forced presentment to a magistrate and any subse-
quent use of force to procure the evidence sought.
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III. CONCLUSION
The significant departure from traditional Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence marked by proposed Rule 41.1 leaves its
constitutionality open to debate. It would appear inevitable
that some will view the rule as an erosion of a great constitu-
tional principle, while others will consider it a necessary and
justifiable means to provide for more effective law enforcement.
The constitutionality of Rule 41.1 must be resolved on three
levels. The first issue is whether in fact any standard of less
than traditional probable cause as suggested in the Davis dicta
will be acceptable to the present Court. The recent changes in
the Court's personnel will possibly strengthen the current ten-
dency to engage in a comprehensive consideration of all the
circumstances, including the relative strength of conflicting
societal and individual interests, to determine the validity of a
particular search or seizure. Moreover, the difficulties created
for police at the investigatory stage by the Davis decision make
it likely that a less than probable cause to arrest standard will
be found constitutional. Second, the Court will have to deter-
mine whether the particular formulation of that less than prob-
able cause to arrest standard as embodied in Rule 41.1 is con-
stitutionally acceptable. If the Court in fact decides that prob-
able cause as traditionally defined is not a prerequisite to the
taking of the identification procedures available under Rule 41.1,
it would appear likely that the Rule 41.1 formulation will be
found satisfactory. Third, if Rule 41.1 is found to generally
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, it must then
be determined whether the variable probable cause standard
has been properly applied in each particular case. This would
involve an examination of the gravity of the crime, the nature
of the particular identification procedure requested, and whether
the procedure relates to the identification of a person already in
custody, either for the crime for which he was originally arrested
or for one having a similar modus operandi, or to a person not
yet arrested. Thus it seems probable that the Supreme Court
will adopt proposed Rule 41.1 if it is submitted for their consid-
eration." 5
115. Adoption of a rule of procedure does not conclusively estab-
lish its constitutionality, however, for this would constitute a non-
binding advisory opinion by the Court. Order of the Court Adopting
Amendments to the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, 383
U.S. 1029, 1032 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 56:667
